The fragmentation of Europe’s political scene and the rise of the radical right have changed the EU’s governance in significant ways. So far, the union has dealt with these challenges relatively well, and public support for the EU has held up. But the bloc remains vulnerable to disruption from Euroskeptic political forces. The elections to be held in 2027 in four of the biggest member states—France, Italy, Poland, and Spain—could turn into key tests of the EU’s resilience.

Political Fragmentation and the Rise of the Radical Right

Over the last three decades, the political-party landscape in many European countries has fragmented. The vote shares of the center-right and center-left parties that long dominated national and European politics have dropped sharply, and hundreds of new groups have entered the scene. In the European Parliament, 127 national parties held seats in 2004. After the most recent elections in 2024, this number rose to 220.

As a result, coalition building has become more difficult, and governments have become more fragile. The record is held by Belgium, which took 589 days to form a government after the 2010 federal election. But in most EU countries, coalition forming today takes longer than in the past, governments’ average length of time in office has gone down, and snap elections have become more frequent. Bulgaria is the extreme case, with eight parliamentary elections since 2020.

The second big trend in national politics is growing support for far-right and populist-right parties. Since the mid-2000s, support for these parties in national elections across the EU has risen from 10 percent to 23 percent. For six EU members today, these parties either participate in a coalition government or support the government in the national parliament.

Practically all these parties take a skeptical view of European integration. They usually criticize it as a top-down project that undermines national sovereignty and sacrifices the values and interests of the majority to the transnational agenda of elites. In recent years, most of these parties have abandoned their previous calls for their countries to leave the EU. Instead, they propose to transform the bloc into a looser association of sovereign states, in which the powers of the European Commission would be cut back and some EU competencies would be returned to the member states. Although this negative attitude toward the EU is widely shared, the parties differ in terms of their radicalism and many of their substantive positions. Attempts to form a united front regularly fail.

The Challenge for EU Governance

Both the fragmentation of party politics in Europe and the rise of the radical right already have a significant impact on EU governance. In today’s complex and volatile political environment, national political elites feel less secure about their own hold on power, and this necessarily influences their EU policies. These elites are more focused on domestic developments, are more inclined to push for short-term national advantages, and have less bandwidth to focus on long-term European concerns and objectives.

Just as important is the gradual hollowing out of the political center. The pro-EU grand coalition of the center right (European People’s Party, EPP) and the center left (Socialists and Democrats, S&D), which had dominated EU politics for decades, lost its majority in the European Parliament in 2019. Initially, the consequences for EU legislation were limited, as a broader mainstream alliance including not only the EPP and the S&D but also the Liberals and, on some issues, the Greens worked well together. However, the 2024 elections accelerated the trend toward the right, and the dynamics began to shift.

The EPP, which emerged stronger from this vote, can now form an alternative majority with radical-right parties. It still votes with its traditional partners on many topics but turns to this alternative majority on issues on which its own position has shifted rightward. Thus, the EPP has cooperated with radical-right groups in weakening parts of the European Green Deal—the EU’s plan to become carbon neutral by 2050—and in advancing stricter migration and asylum rules. Instead of the stable and predictable majorities of the past, the current European Parliament is marked by shifting alliances, transactional politics, and significant friction between party groups.

The grand coalition’s grip on the European Council and the EU Council has also weakened decisively. In 2016, parties aligned with the EPP and the S&D led the governments of twenty of the then twenty-eight member states. Ten years later, the position of the center right is still strong, with twelve out of twenty-seven European Council members, but the presence of the center left has dwindled from ten members to three. The European Council now includes three representatives of far-right parties together with four liberals and five independents.

One can argue that the greater ideological diversity of key EU institutions has made them more representative of the variety of political views among the European population. However, there is a clear cost in terms of effective decisionmaking. The traditional center-right and center-left leaders held different views on social and economic issues but shared a commitment to preserve and develop EU integration. This helped in overcoming divisions and finding broadly supported solutions.

Over the past two decades, this pro-EU consensus has fallen apart. Not only have radical-right parties gained support and entered the government in some member states, but center-right parties have also become more cautious about further European integration and wary of policies that could be exploited by their far-right competitors.

For much of the past fifteen years, the European Council had to deal with disruption from the openly Euroskeptic governments of Hungary and Poland. Eventually, the Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary lost elections and were replaced by more moderate political forces. However, the European Council still includes Euroskeptic national leaders. The current prime ministers of the Czechia, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all claim to defend national sovereignty against encroaching EU institutions and oppose further deepening of European integration.

Failing Forward

Given the volatile dynamics of national politics, EU governance overall has proved remarkably resilient. Certainly, the EU had to give up on its traditional method of reforming itself through treaty change. Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, such negotiations had taken place once or twice every decade. No new treaty reform process has been launched in the past twenty years. Governments came to understand that it would be extremely difficult to agree on major new integration projects and that even if such agreements were eventually reached, the ratification of a new treaty—which would probably require referenda in some countries—would be highly uncertain.

Still, reforms did happen, driven not by grand European visions but by the sheer necessity of overcoming a succession of serious crises. Responding to the financial and eurozone crises in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the EU shored up the institutional architecture of monetary union. The massive influx of irregular migrants in 2015–2016 prompted new rules on asylum and migration as well as arrangements with third countries to protect the EU’s external borders. The COVID-19 pandemic led to a collective vaccination process and the creation of a huge recovery fund to deal with the economic fallout of the crisis. And the shock of the full-fledged Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted significant investments in military capabilities and an unprecedented effort to support Kyiv not only financially but also militarily.

In the absence of EU treaty reform, most of these changes were based on secondary legislation, innovative financial instruments, and, in some cases, intergovernmental arrangements outside the treaties.

The dynamic underlying many reforms over fifteen years of crisis management has been described by Carnegie’s Erik Jones and others as “failing forward.” Some integration projects, such as monetary union or the Schengen passport-free travel area, had been based on flawed arrangements unable to withstand significant external or internal challenges. When the crises arrived, the EU, under severe pressure, adopted measures that defused the momentary challenge but often failed to resolve the problem in a sustainable way. Once the situation calmed down, the reform drive stopped, leaving the union vulnerable to the next crisis.

Over time, this recurring pattern of crisis and response can result in deeper integration, but as an approach to developing European integration, it is deeply flawed. One problem is that only existential crises seem able to generate the political will for the EU to take far-reaching collective action. The “slow agony” of the European economy that former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi warned about in his 2024 report if the EU’s loss of competitiveness is not addressed does not have the same galvanizing effect. Progress in implementing Draghi’s recommendations remains slow and incomplete. The same is true for the climate crisis, which is broadly perceived as the most urgent challenge of our time but lacks the make-or-break drama that seems necessary to prompt decisive EU-level measures.

The other problem with failing forward is that a succession of emergencies tends to weaken the public’s confidence and undermine support for the union.

Recovered Public Support

The EU’s image took a significant hit in 2011–2013 at the height of the eurozone crisis and again in 2015–2016 amid the mass influx of refugees and migrants. Both events played a catalytic role in reducing trust in mainstream politics and enhancing support for radical-right parties.

The UK’s 2016 referendum decision to leave the EU was partly a consequence of these developments but—counterintuitively—also became a turning point. The political chaos caused by Brexit seems to have persuaded many Europeans of the value of EU membership. Opinions of the EU improved significantly and remained relatively high even during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The latest Eurobarometer research indicates that Europeans are skeptical of global developments but consider the EU a place of stability. Seventy-four percent of Europeans consider EU membership beneficial, which is an all-time high. Half of citizens have a positive image of the EU, 33 percent a neutral perception, and 17 percent a negative image.

It might appear paradoxical that overall support for European integration appears solid while radical-right and openly Euroskeptic parties are flourishing in many member states. One part of the explanation is that perceptions of the EU are unevenly distributed across the EU, with Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden at the positive end of the spectrum and the Czech Republic, France, and Greece at the negative end. Also, even if most Europeans take a positive view of the EU, that still leaves many disaffected and skeptical citizens. This may well have been the case since the early days of European integration, but for a long time, the overwhelming hegemony of pro-EU mainstream parties prevented skeptical views from becoming politically salient. With the rise of radical-right parties in many member states, these views are now an important factor in EU-level politics.

The 2027 Electoral Challenge

The EU’s overall positive record in dealing with multiple crises and a broadly supportive public opinion should not give grounds for complacency. In the EU’s current constitutional setup, major decisions on economic integration, financing, foreign and security policy, and the accessions of new states still require the consent of all twenty-seven members. The union therefore remains vulnerable to blockages and paralyzing divisions. National elections are still crucial determinants of the EU’s capacity to face future challenges.

In this regard, 2027 will be a special year. Presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in France, while parliamentary votes will be held in Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain. The number of elections is not unusual, but in 2027 they involve four of the EU’s biggest and most influential members. Also, populist and radical-right parties are expected to do well in all four of these elections.

A victory for Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election in April would probably have the biggest impact on the EU’s future. Over recent years, Le Pen has moderated the strident anti-EU attitude of her party, but she remains a nationalist committed to defending French sovereignty and a profound skeptic when it comes to strengthening European integration. Her plan for a constitutional referendum on immigration would put her on a collision course with the EU. Her presence in the European Council would definitely put great strain on EU decisionmaking.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party is leading the polls, but a new radical-right party led by former general Roberto Vannacci has overtaken one of her coalition partners, the League, and is gaining on the other, Forza Italia. Meloni, who has played a constructive role on Ukraine and some other EU policies, might feel compelled to return to her nationalist roots to preserve her electoral chances. Meloni’s harsh criticism of and sanctions against Spain after the influx of migrants into the Spanish exclave of Ceuta in July 2026 point in this direction.

In Poland, the split in the main opposition party, the populist PiS, that took place in July will, in the short term, benefit the coalition led by liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk. However, in the coming election, the launch of a more moderate conservative party under former PiS prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki might broaden the conservatives’ voter base and could result in a coalition of various rightist parties.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is the great survivor of Spanish politics, but his coalition of leftist parties, which has parliamentary support from regional nationalist parties, faces serious challenges ahead of next year’s election. According to regional elections and polling, the center-right Popular Party and the far-right VOX party together have a considerable chance of winning a majority of seats and forming the next Spanish government.

Election campaigns are unpredictable, and as the latest Polish and Hungarian votes showed, the continuing ascent of radical-right parties is not a given. Still, there is a considerable risk of 2027 bringing a realignment of political forces, with Euroskeptic parties entering the government in some of the EU’s biggest member states. The sense of foreboding is reinforced by the tense political situation in Germany, where the radical anti-European Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading the polls. The party’s landslide victory in the September 6 regional election in Saxony-Anhalt might mark the end of the so-called firewall with which the country’s mainstream parties have kept the AfD from the levers of power. A German federal parliamentary election is not due until early 2029, but the stability of the current coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats cannot be taken for granted.

The 2027 election calendar already overshadows EU policies. It serves as an impetus to push for early progress on several critical files before election campaigns lead to a hardening of national positions. This applies in particular to the 2028–2034 multiannual budget but also to economic and environmental legislation and to EU enlargement. However, this window of opportunity is closing rapidly, as governments that are facing elections are becoming risk averse well ahead of the hot phase of the campaigns.

Although national elections can be critical for the EU’s future, European integration will probably not feature prominently in the campaigns. Governing and opposition parties alike normally prefer to focus on domestic issues, such as the economy, social policy, the cost of living, internal security, and migration. For pro-EU political forces, this may be a missed opportunity. Given the public’s overall positive attitude toward integration, the election campaigns offer a chance to make the case for enabling the EU to be a more effective anchor of stability in a contested world.

Unlike in earlier elections, external actors could play an important disruptive role in 2027. Destabilizing the EU is certainly one of Russia’s major war aims. Through disinformation campaigns and hybrid attacks, Russia could try to influence the outcomes of the elections. Sadly, the current U.S. administration is also likely to continue its ideological crusade against liberal Europe. Helping Europe to “correct its current trajectory” through support for “patriotic” parties is part of the official doctrine of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. European authorities will have to be alert to these threats and develop effective counterstrategies.

What If the Nationalists Win?

The EU already has considerable experience with the behavior of populist-right and radical-right politicians in its institutions. Many such ministers who take part in EU Council meetings represent junior coalition partners, for which a constructive attitude to integration was a condition for joining the government. These ministers generally adopt relatively low profiles, and their positions become part of the normal EU bargaining process.

Some of the prime ministers from such parties, of whom there are far fewer, show similar pragmatism. Meloni is the most prominent example of someone who mostly abandoned the anti-EU ideological rhetoric of her opposition years and now focuses on getting the best possible deals for her country. Central European politicians, such as Prime Ministers Robert Fico of Slovakia and Andrej Babiš of the Czech Republic, maintain their Euroskeptic attitudes but mostly avoid full-fledged confrontations with the EU mainstream. Thanks to day-to-day cooperation and constant bargaining, being present in the EU institutions has a strong socialization effect. Antagonizing your partners can have a high cost when it comes to pursuing your country’s interests.

But there are also the counterexamples of former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and the various leaders of PiS-dominated governments in Poland. Their anti-EU positions actually became more radical during their time in office. In these cases, controversial EU negotiating positions came with democratic backsliding and an erosion of the rule of law. When the EU responded with court cases and funding cuts, the conflicts deepened and spread to other issues. However, the two countries’ relative isolation helped contain the damage. Faced with a strong and mostly coherent majority, Hungary and Poland were repeatedly forced to abandon their blocking moves.

These experiences offer some indications of the likely impacts of the coming election cycle.

First, even a strong showing by radical-right and nationalist parties is unlikely to lead to an immediate existential threat for the EU. None of the groupings in contention is committed to leaving or destroying the union. Most of them will come to power only in coalitions with mainstream parties, which will moderate their anti-EU stances. The internal market as a foundation of European prosperity, the solid institutional and legal infrastructure of integration, and substantial European public support make full-fledged disruption politically costly and unlikely to succeed. However, the medium-term risks for the functioning of the union should not be underestimated.

Second, the size of member states and the constellation of forces matter. A sharp rightward turn by France would be inherently more consequential than a similar shift by a smaller member. The French-German axis is no longer as powerful a factor in EU politics as it used to be, but a serious falling-out between the two countries could cripple EU decisionmaking. Also, the EU majority has shown that it can—with difficulty—handle one or two governments that act as disruptors. A bigger group of like-minded Euroskeptic leaders could result in paralysis.

Third, success for the radical right could accelerate the ongoing trend toward highly restrictive migration and asylum policies, which focus on keeping people out and neglect the need to protect the vulnerable. Radical-right parties in power would also push for a further weakening of the EU’s environmental and climate legislation. In both regards, the radical right would need—and would probably get—the support of many center-right politicians.

Fourth, the Russian war against Ukraine is likely to remain the EU’s most urgent security challenge. Radical-right parties are sharply divided on this issue, but as the cost of the EU’s support for Ukraine rises, resistance in several countries will increase. Locking in the union’s backing for Kyiv through multiannual programs would reduce the risk of a new constellation of political forces putting the union’s commitment to Ukraine in doubt.

Fifth, the functioning of the EU depends on the readiness of all governments to abide by the union’s rules and respect democratic and rule-of-law standards. In this regard, the performance of governments with far-right elements will be even more consequential than their positions in negotiations. Over the years, the EU has developed legal and economic instruments to respond to such threats, but these tools are incomplete and difficult to use. There is an evident need to develop and reinforce them while the opportunity still exists.

Sixth, a stronger role for the radical right may be unlikely to dismantle the EU as it exists today, but it could prevent it from becoming what it needs to be to deal with the challenges of the future. Prolonged failure to deepen integration on economic policy and internal and external security could result in a gradual loss of the union’s relevance, as more and more decisions could be made in alternative frameworks.

Finally, the fragmentation and volatility of the European political scene is likely to continue, and the radical right will remain a major factor in European politics. The days of the grand coalition of center right and center left will not return. Still, even under these difficult conditions, the center can hold—but only if those committed to a liberal democratic Europe show determination, strategic nous, and tactical intelligence and work well together.