On August 7, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. Landmarks in Riyadh, Istanbul, and Islamabad lit up in red, white, and green—the combined main colors of the signatories’ flags—to mark the occasion. Though the text remains unpublished, the advent of such an accord is a pivotal moment in a fast-changing region. The Mecca Agreement is an attempt by three regional powers to prevent the reemergence of a security vacuum in the Gulf of the sort created by the ongoing U.S.-Iranian conflict.  

Following the resumption of the conflict, after the ceasefire agreed in April, Iran’s assertion of control over the Strait of Hormuz was the first signal of a collapsing U.S.-led security order. Tehran had not previously wielded such leverage. Moreover, the significant damage inflicted by Iranian missiles and drones on U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf created a major challenge for countries that had long relied on the United States for a regional security umbrella. From Riyadh’s perspective, something had to be done.

Ankara and Islamabad were not far behind. With many in the Gulf increasingly viewing the American military presence in the region as a liability, Türkiye and Pakistan began to see an opening to replace the United States as security guarantor. Having been excluded from the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), both countries also understood that a new regional security architecture could carry economic benefits and place them firmly on the worldwide development-corridor track. Additionally, Türkiye and Pakistan grasped that there was an opportunity to expand their military-industrial complexes with Saudi funding.

Though it may have appeared sudden to some, the Mecca accord built directly on the terms of the Pakistan-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), which was signed just eight days after an Israeli airstrike targeted the leadership of Hamas in Doha, Qatar, in September 2025. The SMDA established a binding security commitment under which any aggression against either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia would be treated as aggression against both, making it the bilateral precursor to the trilateral Mecca accord. Notably, the latter, like the SMDA, does not explicitly identify an adversary. Maintaining such strategic ambiguity allows the three signatories to frame it as an instrument that aims to facilitate regional stability.

Nevertheless, the statements released by the signatories specified that the accord is “intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression.” The question is: Deterrence against whom? Iran, Israel, non-state actors, or someone else? The answer is not altogether clear.

Another question is to what extent the addition of Türkiye (and in the future perhaps Egypt or Qatar, or both) changes the character of the Mecca accord and might shape the now-three nation bloc’s perception of threats. The SMDA was based on a relatively simple security-economy equation—Pakistan’s combat-tested armed forces could be deployed to Saudi Arabia for defensive services if and when needed, while Saudi funds could provide a critical lifeline to Pakistan’s fragile economy. Ankara’s joining the bloc may well shift the focus to that of shared adversaries. Türkiye is a regional heavyweight with an eye on scaling down Israel’s hegemonic position in the Levant, whether in Syria or Lebanon, and reorienting Arab politics away from the now weakened Abraham Accords trajectory. Ankara and Islamabad cannot impact Riyadh’s relations with their respective rivals, Greece and India; but a shared focus on deterring Israeli and Iranian regional ambitions might be a sound starting point for the alliance.

It is clear that the accord could also prove useful for Türkiye and Pakistan in redefining IMEC. Announced in New Delhi at the 2023 G20 summit, IMEC undercuts both Türkiye and Pakistan by building trade routes around them. According to Pakistani officials speaking privately, IMEC was a topic of discussion in Mecca in the run-up to the emergence of the agreement. By linking defense and regional security to major infrastructure projects, Ankara and Islamabad can bolster their role in international trade routes. An alternative to IMEC that may come into focus is Iraq’s Development Road project. As this route would connect southwestern China (via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar Port) to Basra and then Türkiye and the EU, it could elicit Chinese interest and intersect with the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Perhaps the most significant question remains how serious the commitment by these middle powers will be to an arrangement that seems akin to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In their statements, the parties stipulated that “any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all.” Would Islamabad and Ankara join Riyadh in a conflict against Iran, should the latter strike Saudi Arabia? The answer is complicated, to say the least. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that, in the event of an attack on one of the bloc’s member states, consultations between the three would determine the response.  

It is important to note that the three governments in question calibrated their messaging to present the Mecca accord as being open to those that might take an interest in joining, in addition to not being directed against any country. Türkiye was quick to announce that the accord did not interfere with its NATO obligations, and Saudi Arabia was careful to deny suggestions that the new bloc was in any way sectarian or military in nature. Pakistan stated explicitly that the pact was purely defensive and not anti-India or anti-Iran. Reactions from New Delhi and Riyadh’s rival Abu Dhabi were fairly muted and cautious. Official statements from Iran described the Mecca Agreement as a move away from the U.S. security umbrella and therefore a victory for Tehran.

One real test of the pact’s viability will be whether it translates into coordinated policy across countries where the signatories have leverage or influence. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are already believed to be working together to bring an end to U.S.-Iranian hostilities. And Türkiye is mediating between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding border issues. Might we see greater Turkish-Saudi cooperation in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon? Ultimately, if Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye prove able to align or at least coordinate their stances on a significant number of issues, the Mecca accord could end up being looked back upon as having given birth to a new regional security order.