Turkmenistan’s twin helmsmen—the father-son Berdimuhamedov duo—have again found themselves in stormy waters. During his four years in power, President Serdar has increasingly sidelined his father and predecessor, Gurbanguly, removing his allies and relatives from their posts.

Both project a united front in public, but it is abundantly clear that Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov—who never intended to hand over full power to Serdar—is unwilling to accept his son’s growing independence. Their intensifying rivalry could undermine both the regime’s stability and their ability to hold on to power—especially considering they acquired it largely by chance.

Serdar inherited the presidency back in 2022 but has only now begun the largest-ever purge of officials during his tenure. Dividing high-ranking Turkmen officials into “father” and “son” factions is rather difficult—many of them began their careers under Gurbanguly and continued under Serdar. However, enough evidence has accumulated over the past few months to suggest that the recent shake-ups are meant to eject the team Gurbanguly left behind to help his son get comfortable.

Serdar’s first target was the security apparatus. Major General Nazar Atagaraev was dismissed from his post as Minister of National Security—Turkmenistan’s top security agency and one of the most influential bodies in the government hierarchy—ostensibly due to corruption within his agency.

Atagaraev was succeeded by Dovletgeldy Meredov, who previously headed Serdar’s personal security detail and had been responsible for his father’s security. It is possible that Serdar was suspicious of this longtime close associate of Gurbanguly and shipped Meredov off to the Ministry so he could put an ally in his place. 

Serdar also replaced the head of the Border Guard Service. This is one of Turkmenistan’s key security agencies, responsible not only for protecting its borders but also for securing its oil and gas infrastructure, on whose uninterrupted operation the country’s revenues depend. Colonel Ilaman Ilamanov, a career border guard with extensive service, has replaced the veteran security official Yazgeldy Nuriev, a holdover from Gurbanguly’s tenure.

It is quite telling that the current purge has not affected the Interior Ministry. This is apparently because Serdar appointed his own man—Muhammet Hydyrow—as minister immediately upon taking office in 2022. Hydyrow appears to have maintained the president’s trust so far.

Serdar also shook up the energy sector—the country’s primary source of revenue. Batyr Amanov, the long-serving deputy prime minister responsible for the development of Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, was dismissed. He was replaced by Guvanch Agajanov, the head of oil company Turkmenneft, a close associate of Serdar. Agajanov kept his position as head of the company.

Regional elites were not safe either. The heads of the country’s three largest regions—Mary, Balkan, and Lebap—were replaced, as were the leaders of three key cities: Turkmenbashi, Turkmenabat, and Mary. Although Serdar began replacing regional leaders in the early years of his presidency, he has never carried out such a large-scale overhaul of regional leadership until now.

In addition, two deputy prime ministers lost their posts: One was in charge of science, education, healthcare, and sports, and the other oversaw the transportation and communications sector. The health and culture ministers and a number of other officials were also dismissed.

Gurbanguly’s relatives—at least those not directly connected to Serdar—have been swept up in the purge as well. After dismissing his father’s sister, Gulnabat Dovletova, Serdar went after her son—his cousin Batyr Dovletov, the owner of large tracts of commercial real estate. In August, a number of buildings belonging to Dovletov were demolished in one district of Ashgabat by personal order of the president.

Serdar is locked in a behind-the-scenes power struggle with his sister, Oguljahan Atabayeva, whom their father is promoting as a politician. Two years ago, Gurbanguly appointed her vice president of his charitable foundation. Since then, she has gradually assumed the role of first lady, meeting with foreign politicians and giving interviews to foreign media. Her visibility stands in stark contrast to Serdar’s behavior—he avoids journalists—and has sparked rumors that Gurbanguly is keeping his daughter around in case his son gets too big for his britches.

In public, Serdar plays the obedient son: He follows his father’s orders and showers his sister with medals. At the same time, he is promoting his own protégée—the speaker of parliament, thirty-six-year-old lawyer Dunyagozel Gulmanova. Like Serdar’s sister, she regularly appears in foreign media—where she sells Serdar’s initiatives. It is her whom the president trusts to lead parliamentary delegations abroad and accept ambassadors’ credentials.

Gulmanova’s rise is even more significant given that she is the third-highest-ranking official in Turkmenistan’s formal hierarchy. Serdar is clearly signaling that he too knows how to make strategic moves in the struggle for supremacy.

In the beginning, Serdar was seen as a totally inexperienced politician, completely dependent on his father to make decisions. However, within the first few months of taking office as president, he cautiously began reshuffling his own team and weeding out his father’s appointees. Many of those sent packing were relatives, like Gulnabat Dovletova, Gurbanguly’s younger sister, who headed the National Red Crescent Society, and Gurbanguly’s nephews, Hajymyrat and Shamyrat Rejepov, who previously controlled entire sectors of the economy.

2024 brought a second wave of resignations. Serdar replaced the ministers of agriculture, education, health, and construction, and also carried out partial reshuffles in regional government. The third—and most extensive—wave of personnel changes has been under way throughout 2026.

Many new appointees are Serdar’s age or slightly older. It seems the president wants to create a new generation of elites, indebted to him rather than to his father. Furthermore, by ridding himself of the old team, Serdar gains more freedom from Gurbanguly’s influence.

Simultaneously, Serdar is strengthening his credibility on the world stage. He is growing increasingly confident in negotiations with foreign leaders in various settings—whether at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state, or in contacts with world leaders, including Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. Indeed, abroad, Serdar is already seen as a politician in his own right rather than the former president’s son.

This international recognition strengthens Serdar’s position domestically among both the elite and the general public. After being known as “Arkadağlı Serdar” (“Serdar, supported by Arkadağ”—the latter being his father’s official title) in the early years of his tenure, Serdar now wants to shed that image. Portraits of the former president in Ashgabat have been moved to the outskirts of the city, while the central districts of the capital are mainly adorned with images of Serdar. Foreign tourists are prohibited from photographing portraits of Gurbanguly; they are only allowed to take pictures of the current president.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Gurbanguly to influence Serdar’s decisions. Gurbanguly may have appointed himself chairman of his own political council, the Halk Maslahaty, but it is the president whom both foreign partners and domestic elites look to for guidance. In the four years since its establishment, the Halk Maslahaty has remained a largely ceremonial institution that allows Gurbanguly to formally retain his position in the government after stepping down. A recent meeting of the council provides further confirmation: Although his father formally presided over the meeting, Serdar was the main speaker. He also set the main priorities for the council’s work.

Judging by the fact that Gurbanguly is still trying to maintain some influence, he is having a hard time accepting that his son is increasingly managing without him. Just as during his own presidency, Gurbanguly remains in the public eye: Television cameras rolling, he holds instructive conversations with officials, young people, athletes, musicians, and artists—and, most importantly, with his son, the president. They, in turn, show him respect in every way.

Foreign partners also give him attention: Whenever Gurbanguly attends an international event in his son’s place, he gets the red-carpet treatment. However, by all accounts, it still bothers him that most international attention now goes to Serdar. It may have been particularly painful to watch Serdar meet with Donald Trump as part of the “Central Asia + U.S.” format—Gurbanguly himself is not personally acquainted with the American president. A couple of months later, he, too, started making plans to go to America.

The visit, presented as a working trip, coincided with the first World Summit—a Trump-backed initiative promoted as an alternative to the UN. Turkmenistan was not invited to the summit, but it appears that Gurbanguly had hoped to attend in person. Efforts to convince the American side of the need for Trump to meet specifically with the former president—even though the summit was attended by sitting heads of state—were unsuccessful. The status of Hulk Maslahaty Chairman apparently meant little to Trump’s inner circle and the summit organizers.

Gurbanguly’s trip to the United Kingdom went slightly better. In May 2026, he attended the Royal Windsor Horse Show and met with King Charles III. The British side emphasized the importance of cultural and diplomatic ties, while Gurbanguly once again appeared not merely as a former president, but as the “National Leader of the Turkmen People” and chairman of the Halk Maslahaty. 

Nothing is known about what happened during this meeting, but its very existence seems important for Gurbanguly. Interacting with the British monarch allowed him to demonstrate to both his son and his new inner circle that he remains influential and respected abroad, and therefore it is too early to write him off.

Nevertheless, these efforts seem strange, since Gurbanguly chose to hand over power to his son voluntarily—neither his age, nor his health, nor any other circumstances prevented him from staying put. He apparently remains interested in politics, but Serdar is becoming increasingly independent and open about his desire to break with his father’s legacy. Their covert rivalry will most likely only intensify, although it is unlikely to escalate into an open conflict. They do share one common interest, after all: to keep power, resources, and influence in the hands of the Berdimuhamedov family.

If the tension simmering between father and son comes to a boil, both risk losing power. No matter how much people claim that the Turkmen regime has stamped out dissent, those eager to undermine the ruling family are waiting to come out of the woodwork at the first sign of a crack emerging in the system. So for now, Gurbanguly and Serdar Berdimuhamedov must project unity—the fate of their regime depends on it.